



British Antarctic Survey:

Bringing SMS in from the cold.

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Introduction

Procedures

Training/Education

Reporting Scheme

Culture

Conclusions





Dash-7 (DHC-7)





Main Antarctic tasking:-Intercontinental link (pax/cargo) Remote sensing (mag and gravity) Field deployments to blue-ice fields

Series 110

Increased gross weight Unique cargo door & long range tanks Max range 2320 nm 10 hrs fuel



Twin Otter (DHC-6)



British Antarctic Survey

NATURAL ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH COUNCIL



Main Antarctic tasking :-


Field party input & support Wheel /Ski Meteorological research Geophysical research

DHC6 Series 300

Vertical photography Remote sensing – Near-Long wave IR

Comparison of BAS Operational Area with Europe

Both maps at scale 1:15 000 000 using stereographic projection. Flightlines used on the map of Europe are identical to that of Antarctica, but are rotated so that Rothera Base is in the position of London





















Procedures

Specialised: Linked Travel

Generic: FTL/Duty time














Training/Education

Medical statistics

Preliminary results




Medical events 1986 onwards



Year











Reporting Scheme


Intelligent assessment

Carbon Monoxide

Crane Operation
















Type of Accident 2010/2011 Type of Accident 2009/2010



Carbon Monoxide Incidents






Association between pan height from burner, the production of carbon monoxide (CO) and the time to boil the pan



Crane Operation Incidents





Crane Incident Analysis:

- 1. 40% Involved incorrect load slinging
- 2. 50% Involved Operator error
- 3. 50% poor weather was contributing factor

Identified Areas for Improvement:

- **1. Audit process for load security**
- 2. Audit/Improve Training and Competency programme
- 3. Supervision (haste, weather decisions etc)






Culture

Leadership



Occurrence of fatalities in the history of FIDS & BAS







Conclusions

BAS SMS Frontline Principles

- **1. Identification of hazards**
- 2. Competence in assessing the risks
- 3. Proper controls implemented
- 4. No divergence from safety critical control measures
- 5. Retention of knowledge
- 6. Safety Leadership



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